New Linguistics Entries in SEP

Two interesting new entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia:

CfP: Mind, Language and Cognition: Historical Perspectives.

The first annual conference of the Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy will be held at McMaster University, Hamilton (Canada) 24-26 May 2012.

Invited Speakers

Michael Friedman (Stanford University)
Paolo Mancosu (University of California, Berkeley)
Thomas Uebel (University of Manchester)

Canadian Student Presenters Travel Bursaries

SSHAP will be offering up to 10 travel bursaries to Canadian student presenters. The bursaries will cover transportation to as well as accommodation and subsistence in Hamilton. Bursaries will be awarded on the basis of need and scientific merit.

Call for Papers

SSHAP invites submissions for its 2012 annual conference. Paper submissions in all areas of the history of analytic philosophy are welcome. A selection of papers from the conference will be published in a special volume of the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy.

SUBMISSION DEADLINE: November 30th, 2011.

Submission Instructions

Authors are requested to submit their papers electronically according to the following guidelines:

1) Papers should be prepared for blind refereeing, 2) put into PDF file format, and 3) sent as an email attachment to the address given below — where 4) the subject line of the submission email should include the key-phrase “SSHAP submission”, and 5) the body text of the email message should constitute a cover page for the submission by including i) return email address, ii) author’s name, iii) affiliation, iv) paper title, and v) short abstract.

Time allowed for presentation is 60 minutes (including discussion). We recommend that paper be no longer than 4000 words.

Electronic submissions should be sent to:

For more information, please visit our website

Postdoc in Proof Theory in Vienna

The Vienna University of Technology is looking to recruit one Postdoctoral Research Assistant to work on the FWF-funded project “Nonclassical Proofs: theory, applications and tools”, under the direction of Agata Ciabattoni.

The work will take place within the Institute of Computer Languages (Theory and Logic group) of the Vienna University of Technology. The post is for an appointment of up to 24 months and is available from January 2012.

Applicants should have (or shortly expect to receive) a PhD in Mathematics, Computer Science or a closely related field, a strong background in structural proof theory, nonclassical logics, and, preferably, knowledge of universal algebra or complexity theory. Ability to work independently but also with academic colleagues and PhD students, flexibility and teamwork, are all important qualifications for this position.

Further particulars, including details of how to apply, are available from: Potential applicants are also welcome to send informal inquiries to Agata Ciabattoni ( The closing date for applications is Thursday, December 1st 2011.

Four Experimental Studies on Vagueness

Phil Serchuk‘s paper (with Ian Hargreaves and me) describing some experimental philosophy of logic he did when he was writing his undergrad thesis with me back in ’05 is now out in Mind and Language.  It’s a response to a 1999 paper by Tim Williamson together with psychologists Bonini, Osherson, and Viale, and we also have something to say about Brian Weatherson’s “True, Truer, Truest” paper.

Although arguments for and against competing theories of vagueness often appeal to claims about the use of vague predicates by ordinary speakers, such claims are rarely tested. An exception is Bonini et al. (1999), who report empirical results on the use of vague predicates by Italian speakers, and take the results to count in favor of epistemicism. Yet several methodological difficulties mar their experiments; we outline these problems and devise revised experiments that do not show the same results. We then describe three additional empirical studies that investigate further claims in the literature on vagueness: the hypothesis that speakers confuse ‘P’ with ‘definitely P’, the relative persuasiveness of different formulations of the inductive premise of the Sorites, and the interaction of vague predicates with three different forms of negation.

If you don’t have access, I will gladly send you an electronic offprint — just email me.