Hannes Leitgeb has edited an interesting special issue of Studia Logica on “Psychologism in Logic?”. From the introduction:
There is no doubt that Frege’s and Husserl’s famous attack on Psychologism in logic had a significant influence on the emergence of logic as a separate discipline. Now that this battle can be safely regarded won, it is time to reconsider psychologism from a modern point of view. Logic has taken a cognitive turn in the meantime: formal representations of agents are used as parts of logical models, cognitive concepts are treated as logical constants in much the same way as the negation sign or the quantifiers, the logic of commonsense reasoning has become the joint interest of theoretical computer scientists and psychologists, and naturalistic accounts of logic and mathematics aim to reduce the gap between the apriori and the empirical. Does this necessitate a reassessment of psychologism in logic? That is the question to be addressed by this special issue.