Kurt Gödel, paper on the incompleteness theorems (1931)

Source

Ivor Grattan-Guinness, ed., Landmark Writings in Mathematics (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2004), 917–925

Abstract

This entry for the Landmark Writings in Mathematics collection discusses Kurt Gödel's 1931 paper on the incompleteness theorems, with a special emphasis on the historical and philosophical context.

Characterization of the axiomatizable prenex fragments of first-order Gödel logics

In: 33rd International Symposium on Multiple-valued Logic. Proceedings. Tokyo, May 16-19, 2003 (IEEE Computer Society Press, 2003) 175-180 (with Matthias Baaz and Norbert Preining)

Abstract: The prenex fragments of first-order infinite-valued Gödel logics are classified. It is shown that the prenex Gödel logics characterized by finite and by uncountable subsets of [0, 1] are axiomatizable, and that the prenex fragments of all countably infinite Gödel logics are not axiomatizable.

Download from IEEE Xplore:

Hilbert’s Finitism: Historical, Philosophical, and Metamathematical Perspectives

Source

Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, Spring 2001

Abstract

In the 1920s, David Hilbert proposed a research program with the aim of providing mathematics with a secure foundation. This was to be accomplished by first formalizing logic and mathematics in their entirety, and then showing—using only so-called finitistic principles—that these formalizations are free of contradictions.